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or external barriers (e.g., lack of access to education or an
insufficient quantity of “fulfilling” jobs). If so, many people
spend a good portion of their days feeling alienated while
they work, especially given the external social pressures in
high-income countries to “do what you love” (Tokumitsu
2014). While some people may have an alignment between
their professional interests and life’s ambitions, most do
not.
Assuming that the general axiom in moral philoso-
phy that to be responsible for one’s actions one ought to
be able to do otherwise is true, it seems that most people
are not responsible for the sense of alienation they feel
about their lack of motivation at work. In addition to the
sense of alienation that most workers feel, there is not a
lot most people can do about it since most people are
subject to external (e.g., market) forces beyond their con-
trol. If this is true, then for most people their options are
to feel alienated while working or to take motivation
enhancers so as to complete their work tasks while feel-
ing less encumbered. From a classical hedonist view-
point, it seems that prima facie one has permission to
take motivation enhancers, if one chooses to do so. But
above and beyond appealing to any particular moral
theory, it seems at least intuitively correct to say that
one may take motivation enhancers to artificially moti-
vate oneself toward task x, if one cannot avoid doing x
and motivation enhancers make doing x more tolerable.
One might object that there is some existential and
intrinsic moral worth in the suffering and alienation one
feels from not caring about work, but if so, then it would
seem that the onus is on those who object to advance
why this is the case.
Kjærsgaard’s strong position then, that taking motiva-
tion enhancers is morally wrong if doing so only treats the
symptoms of alienation, seems ultimately unsound in
those instances when one cannot relieve the root causes of
alienation; in such cases, it seems that taking motivation
enhancers is morally permissible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Thank you to Cynthia Forlini for her helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
REFERENCES
Allen, W. 1977. Annie Hall. Available at: http://www.dailyscript.
com/scripts/annie_hall.html (accessed November 13, 2014).
Elliott, C. 2000. Pursued by happiness and beaten senseless: Pro-
zac and the American dream. Hasting Center Report 30(2): 7–12.
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3528306
Gallup Consulting. 2013 Worldwide, 13% of employees are
engaged at work. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/
165269/worldwide-employees-engaged-work.aspx (accessed
November 13, 2014).
Kjærsgaard, T. 2015. Enhancing motivation by use of prescription
stimulants: The ethics of motivation enhancement. AJOB Neurosci-
ence 6(1): 4–10.
Tokumitsu, M. 2014. In the name of love. Slate. Available at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/01/
do_what_you_love_love_what_you_do_an_omnipresent_mantra_
that_s_bad_for_work.single.html (accessed November 13,
2014).
Stop Wishing. Start Doing!:
Motivational Enhancement Is
Already in Use
Alberto Giubilini, Charles Sturt University
Steve Clarke, Charles Sturt University and University of Oxford
At the beginning of every football season, professional
players spend a lot of time working on their fitness, athleti-
cism, and skills. What typically motivates athletes to train
hard is the prospect of achievement, rather than interest in
the training activity itself. Athletes are usually driven by
what psychologists call “achievement motivation”: “an
individual’s investment of personal resources such as
effort, talent and time in an activity is dependent on the
achievement goal of the individual” (Roberts and Papaioan-
nou 2014, 53). The same is true for the many nonprofes-
sional athletes who work out. What typically motivates
people to run, swim laps, or work out at the gym is the
prospect of being fit and healthy, and looking good, rather
than any pleasure they are able to derive from working out.
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According to Kjærsgaard (2015), “Motivation is about
wanting to make the effort necessary to do a task—for
example, a cognitive task” (5). Thus, although motivation
is usually driven by a goal, the direct object of motivation
is the effort that the task of attaining that goal requires
rather than the goal itself. Sometimes it is very hard, even
for professional athletes, to maintain the necessary level of
motivation to produce this effort, no matter how strongly
the final goal is desired. This is why sports psychologists
have become involved in the training of professional ath-
letes. Sport psychology is primarily directed at maintain-
ing and enhancing the motivation of athletes in the face of
obstacles and discomfort (Brewer 2009, 2). Trained sports
psychologists are often employed to help athletes identify
psychological factors that reduce their motivation to train
hard and to help them minimize the effect of these factors.
“Coaches and administrators may enlist the services of
sport psychologists to assist in establishing a sport envi-
ronment with a motivational climate that is conductive to
optimal team functioning” (Brewer 2009, 2). Their methods
include “goal-setting, relaxation, imagery, and self-talk”
(Brewer 2009, 3). All of this can be understood as “social
scaffolding” aimed at enhancing the motivation of profes-
sional athletes.
The use of social scaffolding to enhance motivation is
also seen outside of professional athletics. Many people
who seek to maintain or improve their fitness employ per-
sonal trainers to help them. Although it is well known that
exercise is strongly associated with weight loss and cardio-
vascular health—with 250,000 deaths per year in the
United States attributable to a lack of regular physical
activity (Myers 2003)—obese people and cardiac rehabili-
tation patients often find it extremely difficult to adhere to
exercise programs in the long term, and often find that
they cannot maintain their motivation to exercise without
external assistance (Dishman et al. 1985). A key role of per-
sonal trainers is to keep people who are struggling to com-
plete exercises motivated throughout their exercise
sessions. One study has shown that personal trainers regu-
larly calling participants to schedule workout sessions sig-
nificantly enhanced obese participants’ exercise adherence
in a weight-loss program over an 18-month period, com-
pared to control groups that were given simple supervised
exercise and/or group behavioral counseling (Jeffery et al.
1998). Often personal trainers utter motivational slogans
and other words of encouragement to help keep their cus-
tomers focused on the exercise tasks that they aim to com-
plete in order for their exercise goals to be met. This type
of motivational social scaffolding can also be seen in Japa-
nese corporations where workers are brought together on
a regular basis to sing their company’s song. The purpose
of these exercises is to motivate workers to be productive
and loyal to their company (Suzuki 1985).
Kjærsgaard (2015) argues that when motivation
enhancement is used “for prolonged periods of time” it is
“particularly problematic from an ethical point of view”
(9). He has in mind motivational enhancements that are
medical or pharmacological, such as the use of
amphetamine salts to enhance “drivenness” and
“interestedness,” rather than social in nature. But if what
is ethically problematic is the enhancement of motivation,
in circumstances in which a person does not
“spontaneously” feel motivated enough to carry out a cer-
tain plan, then it is irrelevant whether enhancements are
medical and pharmacological or social. Kjærsgaard wor-
ries that the use of medical motivational enhancement
may “lead us down a slippery slope if we come to see lazi-
ness and lack of willpower as something that should be
medicated away” (9), but if this is a genuine concern, then
an analogous concern should have been raised in regard to
social enhancements a long time ago. Gym goers who
employ personal trainers to keep them motivated fail to
overcome their own laziness and lack of willpower in a
“spontaneous,” self-directed way. Instead, they learn to
live with these internal limitations through the help of
external motivation enhancements.
The recent debate on the medicalization and enhance-
ment of love relationships offers an interesting parallel to
concerns about motivation enhancement. It is often diffi-
cult to maintain desired levels of commitment in loving
relationships, and one proposed way of making it easier is
through the use of chemicals that modulate lust, attraction,
and attachment. Defenders of the pharmacological
enhancement of love relationships typically (e.g., Earp
et al. 2013; Savulescu and Sandberg 2008) point out that
love is already enhanced through social means, for exam-
ple, the use of couples therapy and of marriage contracts
that have high “exit costs,” such as “covenant marriages”
that limit grounds for divorce (Savulescu and Sandberg
2008, 34). If the psychological and social enhancement of
love relationships is considered permissible, then why
would it be impermissible to enhance relationships
through pharmacological means (e.g., through administra-
tion of the hormone oxytocin)? In both cases we introduce
external controls to lust, attraction and attachment. As
Savulescu and Sandberg (2008, 37) put it, “There is no mor-
ally relevant difference between marriage therapy, a mas-
sage, a glass of wine, a fancy pink, steamy potion and a
pill. All act at the biological level to make the release of
substances like oxytocin and dopamine more likely.”
CONCLUSION
It is hard to remain motivated to complete mundane tasks
in order to achieve long-term goals. This is not news. Peo-
ple are well practiced at using social means of sustaining
levels of individual motivation that are well above the lev-
els that they would be able to sustain without external
assistance. Pharmacological means of enhancing motiva-
tion are a new way to enhance what we have been enhanc-
ing socially for a long time. If Kjærsgaard had shown that
it was ethically problematic to enhance motivation, then
he would have identified a way in which humans had
been behaving in an ethically problematic way for a long
time that had escaped everybody else’s attention. But he
has not succeeded in doing this.
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Enhancing Motivation With a Tablet . . .
Wouldn’t You?
Harris Wiseman, University of Cambridge
In a more perfect world laziness would not be medicalized,
students would choose courses based on their aspirations
for the good life, and alienation would not be dealt with
just by taking drugs that make you enjoy whatever it is
that you just so happen to be doing. My concern is not that
Kjaersgaard (2015) is wrong, but that his admonitions will
go unheeded, that the societal pressures and incentives
to use such “motivation-enhancing” drugs in morally
compromising ways are just too weighty when measured
against Kjaersgaard’s high-minded reflections. Kjaers-
gaard has sought to bracket out these larger coercive pres-
sures; I am not sure they can be.
LAZINESS
There are two overlapping issues in Kjaersgaard’s article,
laziness and alienation. The medicalization of laziness is a
particularly interesting focus regarding enhancement
ethics, and in a way serves as a helpful metaphor for the
entire attempt to medicalize complex life problems. It is
hard to disagree with Kjaersgaard here; people who are
just generally slovenly should not be viewed as having a
medical illness to be remedied by pharmaceutical means.
Yet there is something wonderfully self-undermining
about raising moral objections to the medicalization of lazi-
ness, for medicalizing laziness is itself a form of laziness.
And to an extent this is true of medicalization more gener-
ally, insofar as it involves assenting to the idea that all
complex life difficulties can be resolved if only one can
find the appropriate tablet to consume.
Of course, Kjaersgaard is right to chide lazy people for
seeking easy pharmaceutical answers to complex problems
requiring reflection and striving. On the other hand, I won-
der whether merely admonishing lazy people for being
lazy is the way to go. Giving an arduous solution to lazy
persons’ laziness is like telling depressed persons to “just
pull themselves together,” or telling an addict to “just say
no”—if they were willing/able to do that, there would
have been no problem to begin with. Something more is
required. Reflecting upon one’s life and making such
changes requires, at the very least, motivating and sustain-
ing serious cognitive effort, courage to risk and embrace
new possibilities, and commitment to persevere in this
pursuit of the good life. Kjaersgaard is right about that. Yet
this is difficult and rare enough for persons who are not
lazy. Indeed, one might suggest that it is the monumen-
tally difficult nature of this task—one for which we are
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